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A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: METHODS AND 
OBSTACLES FOR ACHIEVING AIR POLLUTION 
REDUCTION IN WASHINGTON FACTORY FARM 
COMMUNITIES 
Linda M. Thompson* 
Abstract: “Animal feeding operations (AFOs),” or, if large enough, 
“concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs),” have become increasingly 
concentrated in ownership, location, and quantity of animals since the 1950s. 
The Yakima Valley of central Washington is one area that has been subject to an 
influx of these industrial farms, raising health and environmental concerns for 
residents. Despite scientific evidence of potential harm, citizens have had 
difficulty enforcing air emissions regulation. The problem is twofold: the EPA is 
still working with the industry to develop a methodology for emission monitoring 
––the effectiveness of which remains unclear––and, assuming monitoring 
methods existed, the statutory framework provides numerous agricultural 
exemptions. State “Right-to-Farm” statutes further exempt some farms from 
liability under the common law. Nonetheless, this comment will demonstrate 
that nuisance, trespass, and/or negligence actions, if teed up correctly in light of 
the state Right-to-Farm statute, can operate to combat pollution from AFOs. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The typical American farm has transitioned over the last 
five decades from a small, family-owned establishment to a 
large-scale industrial facility.1 Prior to the 1950s, American 
farmers raised a variety of animals and plants on their land 
and recycled the waste back into their fields as fertilizer.2 
While this image still permeates the American conception of 
food production, since World War II the nation has rapidly 
moved away from this traditional farming model.3 In the 
pursuit of efficiency, farms now often operate more like 
factories, mass-producing only one type of crop or animal.4 
Of the nation’s 1.3 million farms, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) defines about 238,000 as “animal 
feeding operations (AFOs)”5 that confine animals for at least 
forty-five days per year and do not contain grass or vegetation 
in the confinement area.6 About five percent of these AFOs 
house enough animals to be classified as 
“concentrated/confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs).”7 
The EPA only regulates the largest CAFOs8 under the Clean 
Water Act’s permitting program as industrial point sources of 
water pollution.9 These so-called “factory farms” have 
                                                
* J.D. candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012. 
1. Holly Cheever, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: The Bigger Picture, 5 
ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 43, 43-44 (2000). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 44. 
4. Id.; see also Natural Resources Defense Council, America’s Animal Factories: How 
States Fail to Prevent Pollution from Livestock Waste: Introduction and Executive 
Summary 1 (1998) [hereinafter America’s Animal Factories] (explaining the factory-
like nature of livestock operations). 
5. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations 
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7179 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 
122, 123, and 412). 
6. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)-(c) (2010). 
7. Claudia Copeland, Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture: A Primer 1 (Cong. 
Research Serv., Ser. No. RL 32948, 2010) [hereinafter Air Quality Issues and Animal 
Agriculture]. 
8. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a)-(f) (2010). 
9. See Clean Water Act of 1972 § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). This comment focuses 
on air quality rather than water quality and Clean Water Act related issues. For an 
analysis of the relevant water pollution issues, see Terrence J. Centner, Nutrient 
Pollution from Land Applications of Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 213 (2010). 
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decreased in number and become larger and geographically 
concentrated10 in the areas that are likely the most favorable 
to the industry, including the Pacific Northwest.11 This 
concentration of AFOs dramatically affects the surrounding 
communities by impacting air quality, water quality, and 
public health.12 For example, a single large dairy farm with 
1,900 cows is capable of producing more than 48,000 tons of 
manure in one year.13 This manure typically ends up stored in 
large “lagoons” before being spread on the surrounding fields 
as fertilizer (land application),14 despite the fact that the 
farmland at an AFO15 is often too confined to adequately 
absorb the waste.16 
In Washington, the total number of farms decreased by fifty 
percent between 1982-1998, while the number of animals per 
facility grew, indicating the shift toward larger, more 
concentrated facilities.17 As of 2007, thirty-one of Washington’s 
farms were considered CAFOs,18 sixteen of which are large 
enough to be regulated under the Clean Water Act’s permitting 
                                                
10. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. at 7180. 
11. See, e.g., Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 15 (“States 
with high livestock populations, and with significant numbers of large operations (i.e., 
with more than 300 animal units), include . . . Northwest states,”); Scott Weaver, Cow 
Country: The Rise of the CAFO in Idaho, BOISE WEEKLY, Sept. 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/cow-country-the-rise-of-the-cafo-in-
idaho/Content?oid=1755457 (“Dairy operators fleeing California’s regulations found in 
Idaho a state with space and a welcoming attitude.”). 
12. 68 Fed. Reg. at 7180-7181; see also Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, 
supra note 7, at 1 (noting human health and environmental impacts of animal 
agriculture). 
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-944, CONCENTRATED ANIMAL 
FEEDING OPERATIONS, EPA NEEDS MORE INFORMATION AND A CLEARLY DEFINED 
STRATEGY TO PROTECT AIR AND WATER QUALITY FROM POLLUTANTS OF CONCERN 18 
(2008) [hereinafter GAO STUDY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d08944.pdf. 
14. 68 Fed. Reg. at 7180-7181. 
15. This comment will use the more general term “AFO” to encompass both AFOs 
and CAFOs except where noted. 
16. 68 Fed. Reg. at 7180; see also America’s Animal Factories, supra note 4, at 7. 
17. America’s Animal Factories, supra note 4, at Chapter 28: Washington 1 (citing 
Washington Dairy Products Commission, Dairy Trends in Washington State, Fact 
Sheet (1997)). 
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program as point sources of water pollution.19 Rural Yakima 
County in Central Washington has been subject to an 
onslaught of AFOs since the early 1990s.20 The county is home 
to eighty-one active dairy production facilities,21 including ten 
CAFOs regulated by CWA permits,22 comprising at least 
129,000 cows.23 Faced with increasingly strict state 
environmental laws and high land prices, many dairy farms 
relocated in the last few decades, taking advantage of areas 
with more lax regulations.24 The Yakima Valley has 
experienced a related influx of intense odors and decreased air 
and water quality. Residents now face a multitude of adverse 
health effects, prompting the EPA to list the Yakima Valley as 
one of ten environmental justice “Showcase Communities” in 
the United States.25 One resident put it bluntly: “Everything I 
own is covered with fly specks and dried feces.”26 
Environmentalists, government agencies, and community 
leaders across the country have become concerned about air 
pollution from these factory farms. However, political pressure 
from the agricultural industry, in addition to the difficulty and 
the lack of standard methodology for measuring the volume of 
air emissions given off by these facilities,27 have made the EPA 
                                                
19. See Washington Dep’t of Ecology, Water Quality Permitting and Reporting 
Information System (PARIS), located at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/wqreports/public/ 
f?p=110:300: 2476496851663749 (Select Permit Type “CAFO GP,” as search criteria 
and sixteen active results are displayed). (Last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
20. DAVID KIRBY, ANIMAL FACTORY: THE LOOMING THREAT OF INDUSTRIAL PIG, 
DAIRY, AND POULTRY FARMS TO HUMANS THE ENVIRONMENT 42-44, 51 (2010); see also 
Down on the Factory Farm: The Lower Yakima Valley, ME AND MY PLANET: 
WATERSHED MEDIA’S ONLINE JOURNAL (November 18, 2010), 
http://watershedmedia1.blogspot.com/2010/11/down-on-factory-farm-lower-
yakima.html. 
21. See Washington Dep’t of Ecology, Facility/Site Search [hereinafter Facility/Site 
Search], available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/facilitysite/SearchData/ 
ShowSearch.aspx?ModuleType=FacilitySite&RecordSearchMode=New (Search by 
Program “WATQUAL” and select “Dairy,” “CAFO GP,” and “Dairy Unpermitted,” and 
select “Yakima County” under Search by Location) (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
22. See id. (searching only for “CAFO GP” yields 10 results). 
23. David Lester, Air Pressure – a battle to breathe, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC (Nov. 
16, 2010, 10:39 PM), http://www.yakima-herald.com/stories/2010/11/16/11-17-10-dairy-
emissions. 
24. KIRBY, supra note 20, at 43–44. 
25. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Environmental Justice Showcase Communities, (Mar. 
15, 2011) http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/grants/ej-showcase.html. 
26. Lester, supra note 23. 
27. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 6; see also U.S. 
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hesitant to regulate air pollution associated with AFOs. 
Further, much of the focus on these operations by 
environmentalists and governmental regulation alike is 
centered on water quality issues rather than air quality.28 
However, due to changes brought by the Obama 
Administration and increasing congressional and public 
attention on global climate change, greenhouse gas 
emissions,29 and the interconnectedness of air and water 
quality,30 both the environmental and regulatory communities 
have recently started to focus instead on the air emissions 
from these facilities.31 Additionally, most AFO facilities are not 
large enough to be subject to CWA regulation, and slip through 
the cracks as a result. 
In addition to the difficulty of obtaining accurate emission 
measurements, there are a variety of barriers and exemptions 
inherent in air pollution enforcement litigation against AFOs. 
For example, even if citizens beat the odds and are successful 
in an air pollution lawsuit, current federal laws do not allow 
citizens to recover individual damages.32 Suit under the 
common law is also difficult as a result of state Right-to-Farm 
laws and other defenses.33 Citizen plaintiffs must also be 
willing to face the social consequences that initiating a lawsuit 
can bring. Pressures may arise such as hostility and 
intimidation from fellow community members who value the 
economic benefits of farms, and threatening home visits from 
angry agricultural defendants, like those experienced by 
citizens in the Yakima Valley during a suit against a local 
                                                
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-04/042, RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT FOR 
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/600r04042/600r04042.pdf [hereinafter RISK 
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT]. 
28. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 1. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 9. 
31. Id. at 1. 
32. See Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g) (2006) (establishing a penalty fund 
for damages awarded in citizen suits); Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(c) (2006) (authorizing 
courts to order civil penalties or injunctive relief); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing courts to award civil 
penalties as necessary). 
33. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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dairy operator in the late 1990s.34 
This comment will explore the applicable statutory and 
common law remedies a litigant may seek, and examine 
litigation from Washington and other states in order to suggest 
a litigation model that addresses the air quality problems 
related to AFOs. This recommendation is tailored to the 
problems in the Yakima Valley and similarly situated 
communities.35 Part I of this note provides a background of the 
impact that air pollution from AFOs has on the environment 
and public health. Part II reviews the relevant federal and 
Washington State statutes relating to agricultural emissions 
and the various shortcomings of the traditional statutory 
enforcement route. Part III discusses applicable common law 
as a gap-filler, and successful litigation attempts, as well as 
the hindrances to common law enforcement, including the 
state Right-to-Farm statute. Finally, Part IV highlights the 
Yakima Valley of central Washington State as an example that 
illustrates how to best remedy its air pollution situation. 
II.  AIR POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURAL SOURCES 
AND RELATED HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
EFFECTS 
A.  Emissions From Animal Feeding Operations And 
Resulting Environmental Effects 
AFOs produce large quantities of untreated animal waste, 
which is typically stored in piles or storage lagoons until it is 
disposed of via application to the surrounding land as 
fertilizer.36 Emissions from animal agriculture operations 
originate primarily from this vast quantity of manure located 
in the buildings that contain the animals, stored in the open-
air lagoons, or applied as fertilizer.37 This manure is often 
                                                
34. See KIRBY, supra note 20, at 111-121. 
35. For a short documentary portraying the situation in the Yakima Valley, observe: 
Michael Harris, Dairyman Blues, YOUTUBE.COM, http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=LHK5WTYOGig (uploaded Mar. 23, 2009). 
36. RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 27, at 6. 
37. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 
4958, 4959 (Jan. 31, 2005) (Notice of consent agreement and final order and request 
for public comment); see also Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, 
at 5. 
7
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spread or sprayed in quantities larger than the soil is capable 
of absorbing, and the excess contributes to air and water 
pollution.38 
The resulting emissions contributing to decreased air 
quality include ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, particulate matter 
(PM), volatile organic compounds (VOC), microorganisms, and 
related foul odors produced by these emissions.39 Emission 
rates can vary depending upon the weather, time of day, 
species of farm animal, and methods of feeding and housing.40 
Carbon dioxide and methane, both greenhouse gases, are 
emitted as byproducts41 and are becoming increasingly 
important environmental concerns. However, the focus of this 
comment is on the aforementioned pollutants that effect 
ambient air quality in communities surrounding AFOs. 
Ammonia is a colorless gas with a strong odor42 produced by 
animal manure or other organic matter as it decomposes and 
adheres to particles in the air, affecting ambient air quality.43 
Upon release into the air, ammonia can travel over 300 miles 
before returning to the ground or into water systems.44 Upon 
entering water systems, ammonia can harm aquatic life by 
contributing to increased algae growth and acidification.45 The 
EPA estimates that eighty percent of total ammonia emissions 
in the United States originate from livestock waste.46 
Hydrogen sulfide is colorless, flammable and accompanied 
                                                
38. RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 27, at 1, 6; see also John A. Lory, et 
al., Using Manure as Fertilizer for Crop Production 1–2, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow_keep/msbasin/pdf/symposia_ia_session8.pdf. 
39. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 2. 
40. RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 27, at 63. 
41. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 2. 
42. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry, CAS 7664-41-7, ToxFAQs for Ammonia (2004), available at 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tfacts126.pdf [hereinafter ToxFAQs for Ammonia]. 
43. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
44. National Resources Defense Council, Facts about Pollution from Livestock 
Farms, http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/ffarms.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
45. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 3; see also RISK 
MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 27, at 64. 
46. MICHAEL R.J. DOORN ET AL., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEW OF EMISSIONS 
FACTORS AND METHODOLOGIES TO ESTIMATE AMMONIA EMISSIONS FROM ANIMAL 
WASTE HANDLING 1 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/600r02017/ 
600sr02017.pdf. 
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by a rotten egg odor.47 Similar to ammonia, the decomposition 
of organic matter in animal manure at AFOs produces 
hydrogen sulfide emissions.48 The liquid storage lagoons at 
AFOs often host the largest quantities of hydrogen sulfide, and 
the gas is released into the air whenever the pool is agitated 
and liquid waste is pumped out.49 
Particulate matter (PM) is constituted of direct material, 
such as soil, dust, or manure that is dispersed into the air as a 
result of chemical or mechanical processes.50 PM is classified 
as either coarse particles, or those less than ten microns in 
diameter (PM10), or fine particles that are less than two and a 
half microns in diameter (PM2.5).51 
Policymakers have had difficulty encouraging AFO 
operators to make changes to the management of their 
facilities to reduce these emissions, due to the cost of the 
technology and the lack of economic or regulatory incentives.52 
Research is still being conducted to reduce emissions including 
hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and PM,53 yet the industry lacks 
the technology to completely eliminate these emissions.54 As a 
result, AFOs commonly dispose of waste by simply applying 
the manure directly to the land as fertilizer.55 
B.  Public Health Impacts of Animal Feeding Operations 
In addition to environmental impacts, these operations have 
serious and multifarious effects on public health and welfare. 
                                                
47. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry, ToxFAQs for Hydrogen Sulfide CAS 7664-41-7, 1 (2006) [hereinafter 
ToxFAQs for Hydrogen Sulfide], available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts114.pdf. 
48. RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 27, at 65. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 66. 
51. Id. 
52. Iowa State University and The University of Iowa Study Group, Iowa 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Air Quality Study, Final Report 209, 
February 2002 [hereinafter Iowa CAFO Air Quality Study], available at 
http://www.ehsrc.uiowa.edu/cafo_air_quality_study.html. 
53. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 6. 
54. Iowa CAFO Air Quality Study, supra note 52, at 203. 
55. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7180 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123 & 412); see also Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, 
supra note 7, at 5. 
9
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For example, in the Yakima Valley, residents have complained 
of vomiting from the amount of fecal material in the air, and 
the asthma rate is thirty-three percent higher in the area than 
in the rest of the state of Washington.56 The Yakama Nation 
Asthma Awareness Project was recently awarded one of nine 
EPA grants because of the heightened rate of asthma on the 
reservation.57 At low levels, ammonia and hydrogen sulfide can 
cause eye, nose, and throat irritation and burns, and the gases 
can be lethal at high, short-term levels.58 Permanent, long-
term effects of hydrogen sulfide exposure include irritation of 
asthma, headaches, and poor memory and motor function.59 In 
addition, PM can be deposited in the respiratory tract, which 
contributes to lung and breathing problems and cardiovascular 
disease.60 
The University of Iowa conducted a comprehensive study of 
AFO air emissions and the associated health effects, finding 
that workers at these facilities commonly complain of chronic 
bronchitis, muscle aches and pains, asthma, and declines in 
lung function.61 Another study of people living near hog farms 
in North Carolina found that the residents experienced 
burning eyes, respiratory problems, and diarrhea.62 As 
compared to the control group that did not live near any 
intensive agricultural operations, the North Carolina residents 
living near the farms also reported a decreased quality of life 
and a heightened experience of physical symptoms.63 In 1998, 
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) tested 
                                                
56. Brenda Austin, Yakama Indian Nation Fighting Battle Against Cattle Industry, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 17, 2008, at 15. 
57. American Lung Association, Children Will Breathe Easier in Toppenish, 
http://www.alaw.org/asthma/children-will-breathe-easier-in-toppenish (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2011). 
58. ToxFAQs for Ammonia, supra note 42, at 1; ToxFAQs for Hydrogen Sulfide, 
supra note 47, at 1. See also Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, 
at 3. 
59. ToxFAQs for Hydrogen Sulfide, supra note 47, at 1. 
60. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 4. 
61. Iowa CAFO Air Quality Study, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
62. Id. at 6-7. 
63. Steve Wing & Susanne Wolf, Intensive Livestock Operations, Health, and Quality 
of Life among Eastern North Carolina Residents, 108 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 233, 
237 (2000), available at http://www.ehponline.org/members/2000/108p233-
238wing/wing2-full.html. 
10
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hydrogen sulfide levels at ten factory farms.64 The MPCA 
tested these farms after over fifty families experienced nausea, 
vomiting, blackouts, and flu-like symptoms following the 
opening of seventeen nearby hog farms.65 Half of the farms 
tested by the MPCA exceeded the state’s hydrogen sulfide 
safety standards by as much as fifty times.66 
Odors represent an indirect cause of health effects that are 
inseparable from any consideration of the human impacts of 
these operations’ siting and emissions. While not intrinsically 
harmful themselves, odors often provide clues to potential 
hazards in the environment67 that can lead to psychosomatic 
symptoms and changes in perceived well-being without 
actually causing direct negative health effects.68 Foul odors can 
affect quality of life, property values, and indirectly affect 
health by discouraging outdoor activities like exercise and 
exposure to sunlight. However, due to the inherent subjectivity 
of odor, it is difficult to quantify health effects and empirically 
analyze the impact on public health.69 
At least sixty-eight peer-reviewed or government-sponsored 
studies of AFOs were conducted between 2002 and 2008, with 
twenty-seven or more finding direct or indirect links between 
pollutants from animal waste and adverse health effects.70 Due 
to the EPA’s lack of data regarding the exact number of AFOs 
and the quantity of their discharges and emissions, it has not 
evaluated the actual public health impact of AFOs.71 
Nonetheless, the EPA recognizes that risks exist.72 
                                                
64. America’s Animal Factories, supra note 4, at Minnesota 1-2 (citing Chris Ison, 
State Air Tests Find High Levels of Toxic Gas Near 5 Feedlots; Agency’s Findings 
Confirm Neighbors’ Complaints, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 1998, at A1). 
65. See id. 
66. Id. 
67. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, The Health Effects of 
Environmental Odors 20  [hereinafter Health Effects of Env’t Odors], 
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/sites/intel/docs/Intel%20Package%20-%20Odors% 
20Health%20Effects%20Generic%20for%20Communities.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2011). 
68. Id. at 10. 
69. Id. at 12–15 (noting the subjectivity of odor experiences). 
70. GAO STUDY, supra note 13, at 23. 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 
Fed. Reg. 4958, 4959 (January 31, 2005) (Notice of consent agreement and final order, 
and request for public comment) (“EPA recognizes that AFOs can have a negative 
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III.  TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES 
PROVIDE EXEMPTIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL 
ACTIVITIES AND ARE NOT ADEQUATELY 
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST ANIMAL FEEDING 
OPERATIONS 
The federal and state environmental statutes, many of 
which offer exemptions for agricultural practices, allow certain 
environmental impacts of the animal agriculture industry to go 
unregulated,73 particularly with respect to air pollution. This 
section will discuss the relevant federal and Washington State 
statutes and the obstacles that can arise when they are applied 
to AFOs. 
A.  The Clean Air Act 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1963 and 
significantly amended it in 1970 and 1990.74 The CAA grants 
the EPA authority to establish minimum national standards 
for air quality75 and delegates responsibility to the states when 
the EPA accepts State Implementation Plans (SIPs).76 SIPs are 
sent to the EPA Administrator to demonstrate how the state 
plans to meet and maintain the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS).77 Individual states have the discretion to 
implement air quality standards that are more stringent than 
EPA requirements. For example, states may regulate 
                                                
impact on nearby residents, particularly with respect to objectionable odors and other 
nuisance problems that can affect their quality of life. EPA also recognizes that 
concerns have been raised recently regarding the possible health impacts from AFO 
emissions”); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Premium Standard Farms, Inc. and Continental 
Grain Company, Inc. Civil Settlement: Fact Sheet 1 (Nov. 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/psffs.pdf (“Significant human 
health and environmental risks are generally associated with large-scale Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs).”); RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT, supra note 
27, at 1 (discussing the various health and environmental risks of CAFOs). 
73. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 265 (2000) (“[F]arms are virtually unregulated by the expansive 
body of environmental law that has developed in the United States in the past 30 
years.”). 
74. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006). 
76. Id. § 7410(a)(1). 
77. Id. 
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additional categories of sources such as odors.78 Overall, SIPs 
must demonstrate how a state will bring non-attainment areas 
(those that fail to meet NAAQS) into compliance.79 
The CAA requires that all “major stationary sources”80 
obtain an operating permit.81 Congress crafted the permit 
system to document the pollutants being released at a 
particular site, the respective quantities, and any mitigation 
measures undertaken to reduce these emissions.82 Despite the 
fact that environmentalists claim that emissions from large 
CAFOs likely exceed this 100 ton per-year threshold and 
should be subject to a permit,83 the CAA has not required 
emissions monitoring thus far.84  This is partially due to 
pressures from the industry,85 as well as the difficulty in 
establishing uniform and adequate methods in monitoring 
agriculture emissions.86 The EPA Administrator also has 
discretion to “establish a greater threshold quantity for, or to 
exempt entirely, any substance that is a nutrient used in 
agriculture when held by a farmer.”87 
After the 1990 CAA Amendments, which created the 
operating permit program,88 states began to enact their own 
                                                
78. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 11. 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (2006). 
80. See id. § 7602(j) (defining “major stationary source” as a facility or source of air 
pollution that emits 100 tons per year or more of any pollutant). 
81. Id. § 7661(2); § 7412; § 7602(j). 
82. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act 19 (Apr. 
2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/caa/peg/peg.pdf. 
83. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 11. 
84. See Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006). 
See also Sarah C. Wilson, Hogwash! Why Industrial Animal Agriculture is Not Beyond 
the Scope of Clean Air Act Regulation, 533 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 441–442 & 460–
461 (2007). 
85. See CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of 
Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,951 (Dec. 
18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302 and 355) (“In 2005, EPA received a 
petition (poultry petition) from the National Chicken Council, National Turkey 
Federation, and U.S. Poultry & Egg Association, seeking an exemption from the 
CERCLA and EPCRA reporting requirements for ammonia emissions from poultry 
operations,”); see also Ruhl, supra note 73, at 323–325 (discussing the political power 
of the farming industry); Wilson, supra note 84, at 451 (“[A]griculture has historically 
been a strong political force, and has successfully evaded regulation through extensive 
congressional lobbying.”). 
86. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 11. 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(5) (2006). 
88. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Overview – The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
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laws supplementing the CAA requirements in order to focus on 
regulating air pollution from AFOs and to work toward 
attainment of air quality standards.89 California, for example, 
requires CAFOs in federal non-attainment areas to obtain 
state operating permits and install remediation technology.90 
Oregon and Pennsylvania, in contrast, completely exempt 
AFOs from all air emissions regulation,91 which would directly 
conflict with the CAA if the AFOs qualify as major sources.92 
The CAA provides for citizen suits to enforce compliance if 
the requirements in the SIP are not met.93 If the SIP 
incorporates the state’s laws related to air quality, those state 
laws will also be enforceable under the federal CAA citizen suit 
provision in Section 304(a).94 For example, in Idaho 
Conservation League v. Adrian Boer, the United States District 
Court for the District of Idaho held that the state’s 
Department of Environmental Quality could regulate AFOs 
more stringently by including dust, animal dander and small 
particulate pollution in their emissions standards.95 
Subsequently, Idaho became the first state to regulate 
ammonia emissions from CAFOs by requiring that facilities 
emitting 100 tons per year or more obtain a permit.96 
The small-scale farms in existence in the 1960s differed from 
modern industrial AFOs, and Congress probably did not 
                                                
(Dec. 19, 2008), http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa_overview.html. 
89. J.C. Lester, Air Quality: Policies and Standards 106 (2005), available at 
www.ncsu.edu/airworkshop/Air_Quality_Policies_and_Standards.pdf. See also Andrew 
C. Hanson, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and the Common Law: Fixing 
Wrongs Committed Under the Right-to-Farm, in CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES 
FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 302 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini 
eds., 2007). 
90. Hanson, supra note 89, at 302-303; Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, 
supra note 7, at 13-14. 
91. OR. REV. STAT. § 468A.020(1)(a) (2009); 25 PA. CODE § 123.31(c) (2010). 
92. Hanson, supra note 89, at 304. 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006). 
94. Id. See also Idaho Conservation League v. Adrian Boer, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 
1214 (D. Idaho 2004) (“Approved SIPs are enforceable by either the State, the EPA, or 
via citizen suits brought under § 304(a) of the CAA”). 
95. Idaho Conservation League, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
96. See Idaho Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Air Quality: Permit by Rule for Dairy Farmers, 
http://www.deq.idaho.gov/air/permits_forms/permitting/pbr_dairies.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2011) (click on “Rules for the Control of Ammonia from Dairy Farms” to see 
rule). 
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conceive of this shift when it enacted the CAA in 1970.97 
Because modern farming operations are larger and more 
concentrated than ever before, it is more feasible—and also 
more necessary—to regulate their emissions.98 
B.  The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also 
known as “Superfund,” in 1980, in order to regulate the clean-
up of pollution at hazardous waste sites that are no longer in 
operation.99 CERCLA requires that any release of designated 
hazardous substances in excess of the EPA threshold be 
reported to the National Response Center.100 In 1986, Congress 
amended CERCLA to include the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA),101 requiring 
additional notice to local and state emergency planning 
agencies upon the release of hazardous substances.102 EPCRA 
also allows these reports to be made available to the public.103 
Ammonia and hydrogen sulfide are considered hazardous 
substances under CERCLA104 and any quantities over the 
                                                
97. See Wilson, supra note 84, at 439–440 (discussing the transition from small to 
factory farms); see also Susan M. Brehm, Comment, From Red Barn to Facility: 
Changing Environmental Liability to Fit the Changing Structure of Livestock 
Production, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 813 (2005) (“When Congress passed the CAA in 
1970, it had no reason to suspect that animals could cause air pollution rising to a 
level that would justify government regulation. Today, the increasing use of large 
confinement operations in livestock production makes it easier to identify and measure 
the air pollution animals create because the sources are obvious: waste lagoons and 
exhaust systems from confinement buildings are clear sources of air pollution.”). 
98. See Brehm, supra note 97, at 813 n. 78 (measuring emissions is more feasible 
than in past years due to fewer large operations and larger lagoons and confinement 
areas). 
99. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601–9675 
(2006)); see also U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund: CERCLA Overview (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm. 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2006); Notification requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 302.6 (2010). 
101. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006)). 
102. 42 U.S.C.§ 11004 (2006). 
103. Id. 
104. Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2010). 
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EPA-established reportable quantity (RQ) must be reported.105 
The RQs for ammonia and hydrogen sulfide are each set at 100 
pounds per day and are subject to the reporting 
requirements.106 However, both statutes exempt the majority 
of agricultural emissions. Air emissions resulting from the 
“normal application” of manure as fertilizer are exempt from 
the reporting requirements under CERCLA,107 and EPCRA 
excludes releases from having to be reported if the substance 
released is “used in routine agricultural operations.”108 
The EPA has only twice enforced the provisions of CERLCA 
and EPCRA against hazardous air pollutants released by 
CAFOs.109 In 2001, Premium Standard Farms, the second 
largest pork producer in the United States, along with 
Continental Grain Company, settled with the EPA and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding Clean Water Act 
(CWA), CERLCA, EPCRA, and CAA claims against them.110 
The agreement requires both companies to monitor air 
emissions of ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, PM, and VOC, and to 
apply for a CAA permit from the state of Missouri if their 
emissions exceed the thresholds in the CAA.111 As part of the 
settlement, both companies funded a Supplemental 
Environmental Project (SEP) to reduce odor and air pollution 
from swine facilities.112 
The EPA announced another settlement in 2006, between 
the DOJ and Seaboard Foods (a prominent pork producer with 
numerous farms across the Midwest) and PIC USA (an 
international pork producer) relating to CAA, CERCLA, 
EPCRA, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
violations.113 The settlement included a $240,000 civil penalty 
                                                
105. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 302.6 (2010). 
106. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2010). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006). 
108. Id. § 11021(e)(5). 
109. Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 18. 
110. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Premium Standard Farms (PSF) and Continental 
Grain Company, Inc. Multimedia Settlement (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/psf.html. 
111. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Premium Standard Farms, Inc. and Continental 
Grain Company, Inc. Civil Settlement: Fact Sheet (Nov 19, 2001), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/psffs.pdf. 
112. Id. at 2. 
113. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Civil Enforcement: Seaboard Settlement (Jan. 1, 
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and required the swine facilities to apply manure to their 
fields at appropriate rates.114 The EPA’s guidelines for 
appropriate rates of manure application to land are applicable 
only to large CAFOs, and are determined based on each 
facility’s individual nutrient management plan,115 leaving the 
standard of what is “appropriate” undefined for other AFOs. 
CERCLA and EPCRA are only useful for extracting public 
information when applied to AFOs and do not have a direct 
effect on reducing emissions or health impacts. However, 
citizens can still sue AFOs that fail to comply with reporting 
requirements,116 and have had some success in doing so.117 The 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington 
recently granted partial summary judgment in favor of an 
environmental organization after the defendant dairy farm 
failed to comply with the court’s Consent Decree and 
CERCLA/EPCRA by not reporting its ammonia emissions.118 
1.  EPA Further Exempts Air Emissions from Farm Animal 
Waste from CERCLA/EPCRA Reporting Requirements 
Following these successful citizen suits, the poultry and egg 
industries petitioned the EPA for an exemption from CERCLA 
and EPCRA reporting requirements in 2005.119 The EPA 
                                                
2009), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/mm/seaboard.html. 
114. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, News Releases By Date: Government Reaches 
Settlements with Seaboard Foods and PIC USA, Sept. 15, 2006, 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/7c02ca8c86062a0f85257018004118a6/3933bb
91f85c53fd852571ea0059b7f4!OpenDocument. 
115. Best Management Practices (BMPs) for Land Application of Manure, Litter, 
and Process Wastewater, 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c) (2010). 
116. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
11046(a)(1) (2006). 
117. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 
2004) (holding that various components of a farm complex (e.g. barns and lagoons), 
count as a single “facility” subject to CERCLA reporting requirements); Sierra Club v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 693, 723-724 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that farm 
complexes constituted “facilities” and were not exempt from CERCLA/EPCRA 
reporting requirements with respect to gaseous ammonia emissions not applied as 
fertilizer); City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (N.D. Okla. 
2003),vacated pursuant to settlement (Jul. 16, 2003) (holding that phosphate in 
poultry litter is a hazardous substance under CERCLA). 
118. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Nelson Faria Dairy, Inc., No. CV-04-
3060-LRS, 2011 WL 61882, at 3 (E.D.Wash. Jan. 7, 2011). 
119. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases, 73 
Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,951 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302 and 355). 
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responded by releasing a proposal in December of 2007 to 
exempt air emissions from farm animal waste, such as 
manure, urine and digestive emissions, from CERCLA and 
EPCRA reporting requirements.120 In 2008, during the EPA’s 
finalization of the exemption, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued its own report regarding the EPA’s 
regulation of air and water pollution from AFOs.121 It found 
that the EPA lacks sufficient information about emissions from 
factory farms and how to measure them and called the 
proposed exemption into question.122 The GAO criticized the 
EPA’s study currently underway pursuant to the Air Consent 
Agreement,123 and recommended that the EPA instead conduct 
a comprehensive study of AFOs and come up with a process to 
measure air emissions.124 
Despite the GAO report, the EPA promulgated the final rule 
in 2008, exempting not only the poultry industry, but all 
livestock operations.125 In response to public comments, the 
EPA retained some of EPCRA’s reporting requirements for 
medium and large CAFOs qualifying as point sources of 
pollution that are subject to the CWA’s National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit 
requirements.126 
C.  The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) in 1976 to reduce the risks of hazardous waste 
disposal.127 RCRA prohibits the dumping of solid waste, 
including agriculture waste,128 but offers an exemption for 
manure applied to fields as fertilizer.129 RCRA also exempts all 
                                                
120. CERLCA/EPCRA Administration Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of 
Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,700 (proposed Dec. 28, 
2007). See also Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, supra note 7, at 19. 
121. GAO STUDY, supra note 13, at 4-7. 
122. Id. at 7. 
123. Id. at 6-7; see infra Part III.D.2. 
124. Id. at 7-8. 
125. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases, 73 
Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,951 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302 and 355). 
126. Id. at 76,953-55. 
127. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. (2006). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006). 
129. 40 C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1) (2010). 
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CAFOs that are already subject to CWA regulation as point 
source industrial discharges.130 This leaves the remaining 
smaller CAFOs and AFOs potentially subject to RCRA 
regulation. 
However, manure that is applied as fertilizer may not be 
exempt under RCRA if it is added to fields in excess of normal 
application, as this deems it no longer “fertilizer.”131 In Water 
Keeper Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged 
a RCRA violation against the defendant hog farm that applied 
a large amount of manure to its fields as fertilizer.132 The U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina 
denied Smithfield’s motion for summary judgment, holding the 
issue of manure application as fertilizer to be a question of 
fact.133 The case later settled without a RCRA action or 
liability.134 
Coon ex rel. Coon v. Willet Dairy, L.P. was another case in 
which the plaintiffs alleged Clean Water Act (CWA) and RCRA 
violations against a dairy farm.135 There, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant dairy 
could not be sued for RCRA violations when it was already 
regulated as a point source by the CWA permit program,136 
because CAFOs regulated as point sources have “permit 
shields” against duplicate actions under RCRA.137 
As a result of Water Keeper and Coon, some scholars have 
noted that a RCRA enforcement action against an AFO has 
been rarely used and is experimental.138 This suggests RCRA 
may be better applied as a supplement to a CWA action 
against smaller facilities that are not subject to the CWA’s 
                                                
130. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2006). 
131. Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., Nos. 4:01-CV-27-H(3), 
4:01-CV-30-H(3), 2001 WL 1715730, at *1, *4-5 ((E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001). 
132. See id. at *1. 
133. Id. at *5. 
134. Consent Decree, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., Civil 
Action Nos. 4:01-CV-27-H(3), 4:01-CV-30-H(3), 4:02-CV-41-H(3) (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 
2006), quoted in Tarah Heinzen, Comment, Stopping the Campaign to Deregulate 
Factory Farm Air Pollution, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1482, 1498 n.112 (2009). 
134. Hanson, supra note 89, at 302. 
135. Coon ex rel. Coon v. Willet Dairy, L.P., 536 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2008). 
136. Id. at 174. 
137. Id. 
138. Hanson, supra note 89, at 302; Heinzen, supra note 114, at 1498–1499. 
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NPDES permit requirements.139 A RCRA action standing alone 
would probably be ineffective, as the smaller AFOs would be 
exempt to the extent that their application of fertilizer is not 
excessive. 
D.  Pitfalls to Emissions Enforcement Against Animal Feeding 
Operations Under the Federal Environmental Statutes   
In addition to the various exemptions that agricultural 
facilities enjoy under the environmental statutes, and the fact 
that citizens cannot obtain individual damages,140 there are a 
number of pitfalls that can hinder citizen suits from successful 
enforcement throughout the litigation process. 
1.  Notice, Motions to Dismiss and “Sweetheart Deals” 
The enforcement litigation process does not always welcome 
citizen participation. Federal environmental statutes require 
all potential litigants to provide 60 days’ notice of intent to file 
suit, including the date, location, and nature of the 
violations.141 The statutory notice requirements are more 
specific than Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirements,142 
which make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain enough of the 
required data to satisfy the notice procedures. This is 
especially problematic when polluters are located on private 
property or are making efforts to cover up their violations.143 
Citizen suits must also evade the inevitable motion to 
dismiss filed by the defendant once it receives the citizens’ 
notice of intent to file suit.144 The plaintiff has the burden of 
demonstrating that the violation of the statute is “ongoing” or 
                                                
139. Hanson, supra note 89, at 302. 
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006) (CAA citizen suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 9659 
(2006) (CERCLA citizen suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2006) (EPCRA citizen suit 
provision); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2006) (RCRA citizen suit provision). All indicate relief is 
in the form a civil penalty. 
141. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 54.2-.3 (2010) (CAA notice requirements); 40 C.F.R. §§ 254.2-.3 
(2010) (RCRA notice requirements); 40 C.F.R. §§ 374.2-.3 (2010) (CERCLA/EPCRA 
notice requirements). 
142. See Robin K. Craig, Notice Letters and Notice Pleading: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Sufficiency of Environmental Citizen Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. 
REV. 105 (1999). 
143. Hanson, supra note 89, at 306. 
144. Id. 
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“likely to be repeated.”145 The defendant can receive the notice 
and rush into compliance before the 60-day time period is up, 
leaving the plaintiff a minimal amount of time to re-
investigate an already difficult-to-substantiate claim and 
document evidence that the facility will not permanently 
remain in compliance.146 This often requires the help of 
expensive experts and occurs before the plaintiffs may request 
discovery.147 
A further difficulty is a Washington statute which requires 
that specific information state and local agencies collect from 
dairies and other small and medium-sized AFOs, such as the 
total number of animals and volume of nutrients (animal 
waste) generated, remain confidential.148 Only the data from 
medium and large CAFOs that are required to obtain CWA 
permits is available to the public.149 Information about an 
industrial farm that may be necessary to file a citizen suit is 
only accessible if the operation is of a certain size or pollutes 
enough to trigger designation as a CAFO by the director of the 
Washington State Department of Ecology.150 In addition, 
during the 60-day notice period, local, state, or federal 
authorities may initiate their own civil or administrative 
proceeding against the defendant, often at the behest of the 
defendants themselves that are seeking a “sweetheart deal.”151 
These deals often include relatively small fines or 
administrative penalties, and prohibit concurrent citizen suits 
under the “diligent prosecution” provision of the CWA.152 
Finally, due to the nature of air pollution, it can be difficult 
                                                
145. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57-59 
(1987) (finding that the Clean Water Act’s present-tense statutory language requires 
that violations must be ongoing at the time the suit is filed); Chesapeake Bay Found. 
v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding on 
remand that citizens can demonstrate an ongoing violation either “(1) by proving 
violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing 
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a 
recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations.”). 
146. Hanson, supra note 89, at 307. 
147. Id. 
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.610 (2010). 
149. Id. 
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.64.020 (2010). 
151. Hanson, supra note 89, at 307. 
152. Hanson, supra note 89, at 307-308; 33 U.S.C. §1365(B)(1)(B); 33 U.S.C. 
§1319(g)(6)(a) (2006). 
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or impossible for citizens to quantify or measure the emissions 
from private farming facilities without any federal guidance on 
the preferred method of data collection and measurement, or 
financial resources to obtain expert scientists to collect and 
interpret data.153 
2.  The Air Consent Agreement Grants Further AFO 
Immunity and Allows the Industry to Run Its Own 
Emissions Study 
As if these barriers were not enough to stop most citizen 
suits from compelling enforcement of the relevant laws, the Air 
Consent Agreement between the EPA and nearly 14,000 AFOs 
and CAFOs creates additional roadblocks to enforcement 
actions by state and federal governments, and likely by 
citizens, too. 
As environmental awareness and discussions of potential 
applicability of the environmental statutes to animal 
agriculture operations grew in the early 2000s, the AFO 
industry approached the EPA with a safe harbor agreement 
proposal.154 The industry suggested participating in a study of 
air emissions at AFOs, and underwent negotiations with the 
EPA for the next two years.155 The final agreement was 
published in the Federal Register in early 2005, and allowed 
AFOs to participate in the study and contribute public 
comments.156 
Called the Air Consent Agreement,157 or Air Compliance 
Agreement158 interchangeably, environmentalists responded 
                                                
153. Hanson, supra note 89, at 309. 
154. Heinzen, supra note 134, at 1506; Air Quality Issues and Animal Agriculture, 
supra note 7, at 4; Jennifer S. Lee, Proposal Would Ease Rules of Livestock Farm 
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2003, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9804EFDE113CF935A35756C0A9659C8B63; Cindy Skrzycki, From 
EPA Plan, a Whiff of Danger, WASHINGTON POST, April 15, 2003, at E1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A26778-2003Apr14?language=printer. 
155. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32947, AIR QUALITY ISSUES 
AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: EPA’S AIR COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT 4 (2008). 
156. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 
4958, 4958 (Jan. 31, 2005) (Notice of consent agreement and final order, and request 
for public comment). 
157. Id. See also Heinzen, supra note 134, at 1507. 
158. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 155. 
22
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/4
152 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1 
 
with opposition,159 calling the settlement a “sweetheart deal”160 
between the EPA and the AFO industry. Participating AFOs 
were to pay a civil penalty from $200 to $1,000 based on the 
quantity of animals at the facility,161 and an additional $2,500 
per AFO to contribute to an emissions monitoring study.162 The 
study would measure the emissions of volatile organic 
compounds (VOC), hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and three size 
classes of particulate matter at selected facilities.163 Industry 
participants would run a non-profit organization, the 
Agricultural Air Research Council (AARC), funded with money 
raised by the AFOs.164 The AARC and its AFO-industry board 
of directors were responsible for choosing its own Science 
Advisor to head up the study.165 The study aimed to develop a 
means of measuring air emissions from AFOs to bring them 
into CAA, CERLCA, and EPCRA compliance.166 
In return for participation in the study, the EPA granted 
participating AFOs a “safe harbor” from EPA enforcement of 
certain provisions of the CAA, CERCLA, and EPCRA.167 Under 
the proposal, and incorporated into the final rulemaking, the 
EPA could only enforce criminal violations of these laws or 
intervene in cases of imminent and substantial endangerment 
to public health, welfare, or the environment.168 
The Agreement does not mention whether citizen suits are 
included under the safe harbor umbrella.169 The 
                                                
159. Id. at 7. 
160. See Laura Karvosky, Comment, EPA Gives Animal Feeding Operations 
Immunity from Environmental Statutes in a “Sweetheart Deal, 8 V.T. J. ENVTL. L. 
115, 115 (2007); see also Michael Janofsky, E.P.A. Offers an Amnesty if Big Farms Are 
Monitored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/01/22/politics/22enviro.html. 
161. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 
4958, 4959 (Jan. 31, 2005) (Notice of consent agreement and final order and request 
for public comment). 
162. Id. 
163. Purdue University, National Air Emissions Monitoring Study Frequently Asked 
Questions, https://engineering.purdue.edu/~odor/NAEMS/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 
2011); Copeland, supra note 155, at 5. 




167. Id. at 4959. 
168. Id. at 4958. 
169. Id. at 4958 (making no mention of citizen suits). 
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CERCLA/EPCRA exemption of 2008 also does not mention 
citizen suits.170 However, the initial 2005 proposal says that 
the Agreement “will not affect the ability of States or citizens 
to enforce compliance with non-federally enforceable State 
laws, existing or future, that are applicable to AFOs.”171 Thus, 
citizen suits arising under the federal environmental statutes 
appear to be barred under both the safe harbor agreement and 
the CERCLA/EPCRA exemption, leaving only state-level 
causes of action available to citizens. 
A total of 2,681 AFOs signed up for the program, with 2,568 
final agreements ratified by the EPA’s Environmental Appeals 
Board.172 Continuous barn emissions monitoring occurred at 
just fourteen of the AFOs: five dairies (including the barn and 
lagoon at an unidentified dairy in the Yakima Valley),173 five 
pork production sites, three egg laying operations, and one 
boiler ranch.174 Notably, the Agreement applies only to egg, 
broiler, dairy cattle, and swine facilities, not AFOs with open-
air feedlots.175 
The GAO and others have questioned whether such a small 
study will provide useful data,176 especially given the role of 
the industry in the study.177 Others claim that the Agreement 
was unnecessary, because data documenting emissions from 
industrial farming facilities previously existed, and that 
Section 114 of the CAA178 already gives the EPA the authority 
to require emissions monitoring data from AFOs.179 
Citizens have had little success challenging the Agreement. 
In 2007, several environmental advocacy organizations filed 
suit against the EPA, alleging that the agency failed to 
promulgate the Agreement via proper rulemaking 
                                                
170. See CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases, 73 
Fed. Reg. at 76,948. (making no mention of citizen suits). 
171. 70 Fed. Reg. at 4959. 
172. Copeland, supra note 155, at 6. 
173. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Monitored AFOs (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/agmonitoring/data.html; see also Lester, supra note 23. 
174. Purdue University, supra note 163. 
175. Copeland, supra note 155, at 4. 
176. GAO STUDY, supra note 13, at 6–7; Heinzen, supra note 134, at 1508-09. 
177. Animal Feeding Operations Consent Agreement and Final Order, 70 Fed. Reg. 
at 4960. 
178. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7414 (2006). 
179. Copeland, supra note 155, at 8. 
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procedures.180 The D.C. Circuit dismissed the case, holding 
that the Agreement was an enforcement action, not a 
rulemaking, and was thus not subject to judicial review.181 
Citizens have not challenged the Agreement since, and 
additional citizen suits are unlikely to follow. Though the 
Agreement does not expressly prohibit citizen suits, many 
farming industry lawyers have advised their clients that the 
Agreement would include citizen suit immunity, and it has 
been suggested that courts would thus not respond positively 
to citizen challenges.182 Citizens are arguably less likely to 
make claims against participating AFOs because of the 
perceived lack of success and judicial support that such a claim 
would have.183 
The EPA received the data at the end of the two-year study 
in July 2010.184 While the EPA has only released the raw data 
without interpretation,185 the Environmental Integrity Project 
(EIP), an environmental non-profit, released its own report 
based on the data in March 2011.186 The EIP report indicates 
that the raw data shows some CAFOs are emitting over 100 
pounds per day of hydrogen sulfide and ammonia on average 
days, and that fine particle pollution at levels higher than the 
CAA health-based limits occurred on the worst days, including 
at the monitored Washington dairy.187 
Citing the documented adverse health effects of ammonia 
and the EIP report findings that factory farms emit ammonia 
at industrial levels, the EIP and twenty other environmental 
                                                
180. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. E.P.A., 494 F.3d 1027, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
181. Id. at 1037. 
182. Heinzen, supra note 134, at 1510. 
183. Id. 
184. National Milk Producers Federation, Update on National Air Emissions 
Monitoring Study, http://www.nmpf.org/washington_watch/environment/airquality 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2011); See also Purdue University, National Air Emissions Study 
(NAEMS), https://engineering.purdue.edu/~odor/NAEMS/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
185. Press Release, Richard Yost, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Emissions Data from 
Animal Feeding Operations Study Now Available/EPA also solicits additional 
information to further understand emissions (Jan. 13, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/dc13b657ff6203ce85257817005
ed001!OpenDocument; see also National Milk Producers Federation, supra note 184. 
186. Press Release, Environmental Integrity Project, Unregulated Factory Farm Air 
Pollution at Some Sites Now Dirtier than America’s Most Polluted Cities (Mar. 9, 
2011), http://environmentalintegrity.org/03_09_2011.php. 
187. See id. 
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and animal rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
petitioned the EPA to list ammonia as a criteria air pollutant 
under the CAA in April 2011.188 By listing ammonia as a 
criteria pollutant, the EPA would be required to establish air 
quality standards for the toxic gas that protect public health 
and the environment.189 
During the next 18 months, the EPA plans to analyze the 
emissions data, with expected completion in December 2011190 
and anticipates finalization of the methodologies to measure 
air pollution at AFOs by June 2012.191 The dairy industry in 
Washington expects that the results of the study will require it 
to comply with CAA,192 but in light of the criticism of the study, 
its potential for obtaining usable data is unclear.193 
E.  Washington State Statutes and Local Ordinances 
Washington State has its own statutory scheme aimed at 
protecting the environment, at both the state and local levels. 
This section will discuss the Washington Model Toxics Control 
Act (MTCA), the Washington Clean Air Act (WCAA) and the 
local laws that have been enacted in the Yakima Valley. As 
these statutes are modeled after their respective federal 
counterparts, they come with the same exemptions for farming 
operations, and the inability to accurately measure air 
emissions in order to compel regulation remains present. Even 
at the local level, officials have virtually ignored public input 
and are working with the industry to develop their own 
“sweetheart deal.” 
1.  Model Toxics Control Act 
Under Washington’s Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) the 
                                                
188. Press Release, Environmental Integrity Project, Broad Coalition Petitions EPA 
to Regulate Ammonia Gas Pollution From Factory Farms (Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://environmentalintegrity.org/04_06_2011.php. 
189. See id. 
190. National Milk Producers Federation, supra note 184. See also Purdue 
University, supra note 184. 
191. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic Information: Emissions Monitoring at Animal 
Feeding Operations (AFOs) (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/ 
agmonitoring/basicinfo.html. 
192. Lester, supra note 23. 
193. GAO STUDY, supra note 13, at 6-7. 
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Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) has the 
authority over toxic waste cleanup and is charged with 
investigating both actual and threatened release sites.194 Like 
CERCLA, MTCA primarily addresses cleanup of past waste 
sites, but it may also apply to potential or current polluters.195 
MTCA applies to any Washington State facility where there 
is a “release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
that may pose a threat to human health or the 
environment.”196 An AFO meets the definition of a “facility,” 
which includes a storage “lagoon,” or “any site or area where a 
hazardous substance. . .has been deposited, stored, disposed of, 
or placed, or otherwise come to be located.”197 However, MTCA 
allows defenses to liability not found in CERCLA, one of which 
exempts the application of fertilizers or pesticides for purposes 
of growing food crops, as long as the application is in 
accordance with the law and is not negligent.198 Washington 
Courts have not yet determined whether AFO crops are “food 
crops” and therefore exempt under MTCA. 
2.  Washington Clean Air Act 
Washington enacted the Washington Clean Air Act 
(WCAA)199 in 1957, and amended it in 1991 pursuant to the 
federal CAA Amendments of 1990.200 The WCAA gives Ecology 
the authority to regulate air quality within the state, and 
establishes air pollution control authorities at the local level.201 
These seven local agencies undertake most of the enforcement 
and may enact more stringent standards.202 
                                                
194. WASH. REV. CODE  § 70.105D.030 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.050(1) 
(2010). 
195. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-100 (2009). 
196. Id. § 173-340-110(1). 
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.020(5) (2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-200 
(2009). 
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(3)(d) (2010). 
199. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.11-.996 (2010). 
200. Washington Clean Air Act of 1991, Laws 1991, ch. 199 (1991) (codified as 
amended at RCW 70.94 (2010)); see also 23 TIMOTHY BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, 
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.1, at 81 (2d ed. 2010) 
(“The Washington CAA was substantially revised in 1991 to implement the 
requirements of the federal 1990 CAA Amendments.”). 
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.141 (2010). 
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.860 (2010); see also BUTLER & KING, supra note 200, 
at § 5.1 p. 90-92 (“The local authorities conduct most of the air quality enforcement 
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Like the federal CAA, the WCAA requires that major 
stationary sources—those emitting 100 tons or more per year 
of a regulated air pollutant203—register with Ecology or the 
local air authority.204 Non-major sources are considered exempt 
from the requirements unless Ecology or the administrator 
promulgates a rule that states otherwise205 or deems the 
facility a threat to public health or welfare.206 Thus, because 
AFOs rarely qualify as a “major source” due to their uncertain 
emission quantities, the WCAA, like the CAA, is unable to 
enforce air quality standards against them. 
a.  Local Air Control in the Yakima Valley: Yakima Regional 
Clean Air Agency 
The Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency (YRCAA) governs 
air quality in the Yakima Valley.207 It enforces certain federal 
regulations, the WCAA, other Washington State regulations, 
and its own local regulations in Yakima County, except for the 
portions of the county that are part of the Yakama Indian 
Reservation, which are governed by the EPA.208 In 2002, the 
YRCAA enacted an amendment that repealed the existing 
emissions standards for AFOs,209 despite Yakima Valley’s non-
attainment status for particulate matter.210 
In July 2010, under pressure from local citizen groups 
concerned about the decline in air quality from dairy-
producing AFOs in the area,211 the YRCAA prepared a draft 
                                                
actions in the state and they have the power to adopt emission standards more 
stringent than the state’s.”). 
203. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-401-200(19) (2009). 
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.151 (2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-400-100 
(2009). 
205. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-401-300(2)(a) (2009). 
206. Id. at 1(b). 
207. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, About Us, http://www.yakimacleanair.org/ 
about.htm (last visited April 26 2011). 
208. Id. 
209. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, Regulation 1 of the YRCCA (2002), 
available at http://www.yakimacleanair.org/PDFs/Regulation%201%20YRCAA/ 
YRCAA%20Regulation%201_2002i.pdf. 
210. See BUTLER & KING, supra note 200, at § 5.22 (“Nonattainment areas for PM10 
include Spokane, Yakima, Wallula and some localized areas around Puget Sound.”). 
211. See Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, Air Quality Management Pilot 
(Research) Project for Dairies, http://www.yakimacleanair.org/Dairy Emissions.html 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (“In June this year citizens voiced concerns about the 
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policy with input from local dairy operators (but with no public 
involvement). 
Under the draft policy, all commercial dairy operations 
where “the potential for significant air pollution exists” must 
install economically and technologically feasible best 
management practices (BMPs) for minimizing emissions.212 
Dairy operations must also prepare an annual Air Quality 
Management Plan (AQMP) and identify the BMPs and 
operational procedures that the facility plans to use to control 
its emissions.213 The AQMP must also describe the facility and 
all of its areas in detail, including how the specific emissions of 
particulate matter, ammonia, volatile organic compounds, 
hydrogen sulfide, odor, methane, and nitrous oxide will be 
reduced in each area.214 The YRCAA commits to make a good 
faith effort to negotiate with the dairy operators in approving 
the AQMPs.215 Once approved, the YRCAA will inspect the 
facilities and may issue a Notice of Violation if the operation is 
not in compliance.216 RCW Section 42.56.610 prohibits 
disclosure of such information, and unless the facility is a 
CAFO, some details of the AQMPs will not be available to the 
public.217 The YRCAA may propose additional or alternative 
BMPs if the approved plan is ineffective, and will collaborate 
with dairy operators to attain effective BMPs.218 
                                                
effects of emissions from dairies to the Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency (YRCAA) 
Board of Directors. As a result the Board directed staff to address these concerns. In 
July this year staff proposed a policy-making process aimed at identifying and 
implementing BMPs at dairy operations in YRCAA’s jurisdiction.”). 
212. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, Draft Air Quality Management Policy and 
Best Management Practices for Dairy Operations 1-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.yakimacleanair.org/PDFs/draft%20policy%209nov10.pdf. 
213. Id. at 3. 
214. Id. at 4–5. 
215. Id. at 6. 
216. Id. at 7. 
217. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, Concise Explanatory Statement: Pilot 
Project for the Air Quality Management Policy and Best Management Practices for 
Dairy Operations 41 (2011) [hereinafter Concise Explanatory Statement, 2011], 
available at http://www.yakimacleanair.org/PDFs/Dairy/Concise%20Explanatory%20 
Statement_web.pdf. 
218. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, Concise Explanatory Statement: Pilot 
Project for the Air Quality Management Policy and Best Management Practices for 
Dairy Operations 3 (2010) [hereinafter Concise Explanatory Statement, 2010], 
available at http://www.yakimacleanair.org/PDFs/Dairy/Dairy%20Policy%20 
COMMENTS%20ONLY_14Dec10.pdf 
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The YRCAA began the pilot project in February 2011 and 
plans to continue it until the end of 2011.219 At the end of the 
pilot project, the YRCAA will assess the effectiveness of the 
program, modify it as necessary, and present a final policy 
proposal to the YRCAA Board of Directors.220 
The proposal was open for public comment for just one 
month, from November 8 to December 9, 2010. 221 Despite the 
short duration of time citizens had to respond to the proposal, 
the YRCAA received twenty-three heavily critical comments 
from community members and environmentalists.222 Many 
commenters were upset that the public was not included in the 
“work group.”223 One commenter pointed out that excluding 
members of the environmental community in the process, and 
working solely with industry representatives, violates RCW 
Section 70.94.240.224 The statute provides that at least one 
member of an air pollution control advisory council must 
represent the environmental community.225 
Others, including researchers from the Environmental 
Health Engineering program at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health, recommended that the proposal be 
completely revamped and re-released for public comment, 
because it is vague and lacks scientific references.226 They also 
alleged that it fails to address how the suggested BMPs will be 
effective and will not increase other sources of pollution, like 
water pollution.227 
Citing the concurrent Air Consent Agreement program as a 
potential source of conflict, the Northwest Dairy Association 
argued that the regulation of the substances in the proposal, 
without any consideration of whether or not they exceed the 
regulatory thresholds, exceeds the authority granted under the 
CAA.228 The industry also noted that the proposal is more 
                                                
219. Concise Explanatory Statement, 2011, supra note 217, at 1. 
220. Id. 
221. Concise Explanatory Statement, 2010, supra note 218, at 7. 
222. Id. at 3. 
223. Id. at 41, 56.  See also Lester, supra note 23. 
224. Concise Explanatory Statement, 2010, supra note 218, at 41. 
225. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.240 (2010). 
226. Concise Explanatory Statement, 2010, supra note 218, at 47-52. 
227. Id. at 51-52. 
228. Id. at 53. 
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stringent than an Idaho rule that focuses only on ammonia.229 
The YRCAA responded to the public comments and 
approved the pilot project on February 10, 2011, to begin 
immediately and run to the end of the year.230 In response to 
concerns about excluding the public, the YRCAA said, 
“participants . . . were chosen by the Air Pollution Control 
Officer to best accomplish the purpose of the Work Group,”231 
and “[i]t is because we represent all people that YRCAA is 
undertaking this effort.”232 The agency also said it was not an 
authority on public health and could not comment on those 
issues, leaving them for someone with adequate expertise.233 
In light of the YRCAA’s response to the public comments, 
and with the pilot project underway, concerned citizens in the 
Yakima Valley have little ability to influence the YRCAA 
through administrative means. It is unclear how this method 
of policymaking at the local level promotes the YRCAA’s stated 
mission statement “to protect the people and the environment 
of Yakima County from the effects of air pollution,” or whether 
it is in line with its vision of “[a]n unceasing commitment to 
build and maintain partnerships in the continuous 
improvement of air quality for all current and future 
generations in Yakima County.”234 
IV.  COMMON LAW CAN BE USED AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
IN ACTIONS AGAINST AFOS 
Due to the shortcomings of the statutory enforcement route 
under federal, state, and local law, environmentalists have 
proposed using the common law as an alternative method of 
enforcement and as a gap-filler in various areas of 
                                                
229. See id. (“[The proposal] subjects dairies in the Yakima area to air quality 
requirements that do not exist for dairies anywhere else in the country.”); see also 
Idaho Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, supra note 96. 
230. Press Release, Yakima Regional Clean Air Authority, Pilot (Research) Project 
Approved (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.yakimacleanair.org/Dairy%20 
Emissions.html. 
231. Concise Explanatory Statement, 2011, supra note 217, at 24. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 38. 
234. Yakima Regional Clean Air Agency, About Us, http://www.yakimacleanair.org/ 
about.htm (last visited April 26 2011). 
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environmental law.235 This approach suggests that litigants 
may be able to recover private damages and injunctive relief, 
unlike the solely public relief available in the statutory 
scheme. There are several potential common law causes of 
action available in Washington State suits against AFOs, but 
substantial hurdles still exist. State Right-to-Farm laws can 
pose significant roadblocks to many nuisance actions, and 
defendants can assert several other affirmative defenses to 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence actions. 
A.  Nuisance 
Washington State law defines nuisance as an act or omission 
that “annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health 
or safety of others, offends decency, or unlawfully interferes 
with, obstructs or tends to obstruct . . . or in any way renders 
other persons insecure in life, or in the use of property.”236 
Washington common law similarly defines nuisance as 
interference with the use and enjoyment of one’s property.237 
Interference caused by an unlawful activity is a nuisance per 
se, and is “not excusable under any circumstances.”238 
Nuisance can be inflicted intentionally, recklessly, or 
negligently239 and can be public or private.240 A public nuisance 
is an unreasonable interference with a right that is common to 
the general public,241 while a private nuisance is the 
interference with the personal use and enjoyment of private 
land.242 Air pollution typically constitutes both a public and a 
private nuisance.243 In Washington, a nuisance claim has a 
                                                
235. See, e.g, CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE 
ENVIRONMENT (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007). 
236. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.120(20) (2010). 
237. See Bodin v. City of Stanwood, 79 Wash. App. 313, 318 n. 2, 901 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (Wash. Ct. App.1995) (citing 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.2, 
at 33 (1986)). 
238. State ex rel. Bradford v. Stubblefield, 36 Wash. 2d 664, 669, 220 P.2d 305, 308-
309 (Wash. 1950); see also Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 325, 
154 P. 450, 451 (Wash. 1916). 
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). 
240. Id. § 821A. 
241. Id. § 821B. 
242. Id. § 821D. 
243. JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING 
AND CONTROL LAW § 14.2, at 637 (1998). 
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two-year statute of limitations.244 Litigants can obtain both 
injunctive relief and monetary damages in a nuisance action,245 
but courts will often deny an injunction if it would cause 
significant hardship to the defendant or the community.246 
To have a successful nuisance claim, the action interfering 
with the enjoyment of property must be unreasonable and 
cause significant harm.247 The standard for significant harm is 
objective and the nuisance must be an invasion that would 
offend a reasonable person.248 An offensive odor cannot be the 
only grounds for a nuisance action – the plaintiff must also 
suffer from objective, physical symptoms as a result of the 
odor.249 
Further, the activity causing the nuisance must be an 
unreasonable use of the land, taking the surrounding 
circumstances into consideration.250 The activity can amount to 
a nuisance if the location for the activity or the manner in 
which it is carried out is unreasonable.251 In a known 
agricultural area, for example, a new suburban development 
cannot complain of a nuisance from previously established 
farms.252 A nuisance claim against an AFO can be successful if 
the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate the significant harm 
element and show that they lived in the area before the facility 
began operating, in order to avoid applicability of the state 
Right-to-Farm Act. 
                                                
244. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.130 (2010). 
245. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 243, at § 14.5 p.641-642. 
246. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) 
(imposing damages instead of injunction when injunction would result in defendant 
having to close down $45,000,000 plant that employs over 300 people). 
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979); see also Bodin v. City of 
Stanwood, 79 Wash. App. 313, 318, 901 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Wash. Ct. App.1995). 
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979). 
249. Mathewson v. Primeau, 64 Wash. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (Wash. 1964) (holding 
that odor and aesthetics alone did not amount to a nuisance); Morin v. Johnson, 49 
Wash. 2d 275, 300 P.2d 569 (Wash. 1956) (finding that there was no nuisance when 
only some residents complained of odor and physical symptoms and tire plant was in 
commercial area). 
250. Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (Wash. 
1952) (overruled on other grounds); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash. 2d 
14, 129 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1942) (holding that in an industrial area, emissions and 
noises did not amount to nuisance). 
251. Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wash. 2d 1, 13, 954 P.2d 877, 883 (Wash. 1998). 
252. Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 134 Wash. 2d 673, 952 P.2d 
610 (Wash. 1998). 
33
Thompson: A Breath of Fresh Air: Methods and Obstacles for Achieving Air Po
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
2011] A BREATH OF FRESH AIR 163 
 
1.  The Right-to-Farm Act as a Defense to Nuisance Actions 
During the 1980s, as suburban developments spread across 
the country and into rural areas, policymakers became 
concerned about the possibility of small farmers being subject 
to nuisance lawsuits by individuals moving into what was 
previously farmland.253 In response, every state enacted some 
kind of “right-to-farm” law.254 Such laws typically protect 
existing farms from nuisance liability, essentially codifying 
what is called the “coming to the nuisance” defense.255 Even as 
farms have increasingly become more industrialized and 
concentrated, the right-to-farm (or RTF) laws have continued 
to apply to them, just as if they were small family farms.256 
Washington’s RTF law, titled “Agricultural Activities-
Protection from Nuisance Lawsuits (the Act),” was enacted in 
1979,257 with a goal to protect “agricultural activities conducted 
on farmland . . . in urbanizing areas . . . from nuisance 
lawsuits.”258 The Act provides a rebuttable presumption that a 
farm or other agricultural activity is not a nuisance when 
three conditions are met: (1) the farming activity does not have 
a substantial adverse effect on public health and safety; (2) the 
activity is consistent with the applicable laws, rules, and good 
agricultural practices; and (3) the activity was established 
before the surrounding nonagricultural activities.259 As long as 
the AFO or CAFO complies with the applicable laws and local 
rules, it is presumed to be undertaking good agricultural 
practices and not negatively affecting the public health and 
                                                
253. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to 
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 
97–98 (1983). 
254. See generally Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: 
When do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87 (2006); Neil 
D. Hamilton, Right-To-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts 
to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 103 (1998); 
Alexander A. Reinert, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1694 (1998). 
255. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 243, at § 14.6 p.645. 
256. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21780 at *14 (1998); see also Hanson, supra note 89, at 325. 
257. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.300–310 and .905 (2010). 
258. Id. § 7.48.300. 
259. Id. § 7.48.305. 
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safety,260 unless it significantly expands or changes its 
established “activity.”261 The Act was amended in 1992 to 
include the passage, “[n]othing in this section shall affect or 
impair any right to sue for damages.”262 The Act does not 
mention any conferred immunity from negligence or trespass 
actions, unlike some of the RTF laws in other states that afford 
broader immunity.263 
a.  Limitations on Washington’s Right-to-Farm Act 
One of the nation’s few successful Right-to-Farm Act 
challenges occurred in Washington State, prompting analysis 
by many legal scholars.264 In Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, 
Ltd. Partnership, a Washington couple brought an action 
against a neighboring cattle feedlot and meat processing plant, 
challenging the Act in federal court, and alleging that the 
facilities were liable for nuisance, stemming from the odor; 
trespass, from the flies and manure dust; and negligence.265 
The defendants, who were in compliance with applicable 
permits and regulations, asserted that the Act insulated them 
from liability for nuisance.266 The Buchanans pointed out that 
they had lived in the area and established their own farm 8 
years before the other farms began operating, rendering the 
statute inapplicable267 because the Act’s legislative intent was 
to protect existing farms from nuisance claims by newcomers 
to the area.268 
The plaintiffs further relied on the language of the 1992 
                                                
260. Id. § 7.48.305(2). 
261. Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 680, 952 P.2d at 614; but see. Payne v. Skaar, 127 
Idaho 341, 344, 900 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1995) (holding that Idaho’s Right-to-Farm Act 
does not confer nuisance immunity to a feedlot that expands and subsequently causes 
a nuisance). 
262. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.305(4) (2010). 
263. Id. § 7.48.305 (referring only to negligence); Hanson, supra note 89, at 326. 
264. See generally Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A Feitshans, Nuisance 
Revisited After Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121 (2000); see also 
Jennifer L. Beidel, Comment, Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers 
or An Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 165–66 (2005); Jordan, 
supra note 297, at 959–60. 
265. Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 676, 952 P.2d at 611. 
266. Id. at 676, 952 P.2d at 611. 
267. Id. at 677, 952 P.2d at 611. 
268. Id. at 678, 952 P.2d at 610, 613. 
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amendment, claiming that even if the Act was applicable, the 
amendment only prohibited nuisance actions for injunctions, 
not actions for damages.269 The Washington State Supreme 
Court, answering a certified question from the district court, 
disagreed with the plaintiffs, holding that despite the 1992 
amendment, the statute did confer nuisance immunity from 
both damages and injunctions.270 The Court explained that the 
plaintiff’s interpretation of the 1992 amendment would “fully 
gut the Right-to-Farm Act.”271 
While the question of whether the Act could be used as a 
defense for the defendant’s particular conduct was not certified 
to the Washington Supreme Court, the Court discussed the 
issue in its opinion.272 Based on legislative intent, the Court 
agreed with the plaintiffs that nuisance immunity should be 
construed narrowly and should apply only when “urbanizing 
areas” are encroaching on established farms.273 In this way, 
the Act does not apply to situations where the plaintiff is 
“agricultural . . . or rural . . . especially if the plaintiff occupied 
the land before the nuisance activity was established.”274 
Citing public policy reasons, the Court also said in dictum that 
the Act is similar to a prescriptive easement because it gives 
farms “quasi-easements” against urban developers who have 
notice of the existing agricultural activities.275 
Relying on the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the scope of immunity created by the Act, the 
district court allowed the plaintiffs’ nuisance claim to go 
forward, and held that the Buchanans were farmers who had 
moved to the area before the defendants’ farms were 
established.276 After the district court denied the defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment,277 the plaintiffs settled out of 
court with the feedlot on the nuisance and trespass claims, and 
the meat processing plant on the nuisance claim.278 
                                                
269. Id. at 677, 952 P.2d at 612. 
270. Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 673, 952 P.2d at 610. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 684-685, 952 P.2d at 616. 
273. Id. at 680, 952 P.2d at 615. 
274. Id. at 684, 952 P.2d at 615–616. 
275. Id. at 683, 952 P.2d at 615. 
276. Buchanan, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21780 at *14. 
277. Id. 
278. Email correspondence with counsel for plaintiffs, David S. Mann (Jan. 25, 2010) 
 
36
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/4
166 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1 
 
Yakima County enacted its own form of the RTF Act, which 
protects “farm operation[s]” from being considered a public or 
private nuisance.279 However, county ordinances in 
Washington State are only valid if they do not conflict with the 
state law.280 Here, the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buchanan preempts the Yakima ordinance, and 
thus, the Yakima ordinance is likely of little relevance to 
nuisance suits. 
b.  Other Constitutional Challenges to State Right-to-Farm 
Statutes 
Scholars and litigants have argued that some RTF statutes 
may in fact be unconstitutional under both federal and state 
constitutions.281 Iowa is the only state that found its RTF Act 
contrary to the state and federal constitution.282 In Bormann v. 
Board of Supervisors, the Iowa Supreme Court held that 
conferring nuisance immunity to an agricultural area 
effectively gave the farm an easement over the neighboring 
property by giving the farm the right to maintain a 
nuisance.283 Because an easement is considered a property 
interest subject to the protections in the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution,284 and Iowa’s state 
constitution,285 the Iowa RTF Act functioned as a taking of the 
farm’s surrounding private property without just 
compensation.286 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied 
certiorari to hear the case.287 
Iowa later clarified this holding in Gacke v. Pork Xtra, 
LLC.288 There, the Iowa Supreme Court explained that the 
                                                
(on file with author). 
279. Yakima County Code (YCC) §§ 6.22.010–040 (1990). 
280. Entm’t Indus. Coal. v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep’t, 153 Wash.2d 657, 
663, 105 P.3d 985, 987–988 (2005). 
281. Hanson, supra note 89, at 328–331; JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 
243, § 14.7 at 646–47. 
282. Bormann v. Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,235 
(Iowa 1998), cert denied 119 S.Ct. 1096. 
283. Id. at 316. 
284. United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333, 339 (1910). 
285. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321. 
286. Id. 
287. Id.. 
288. Gacke v. Pork Xtra, LLC, 684 N.W.2d 168, 173–74, 2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 193, 
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Iowa RTF Act is only unconstitutional when a diminution in 
the plaintiff’s property value occurs, as this loss functions as 
the uncompensated taking of private property.289 Aside from 
damages available for diminution of property value as a result 
of the nuisance, all other immunity conferred by the state 
legislature in the RTF Act is constitutional.290 
In contrast, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division came out the opposite way in a similar case.291 New 
York’s RTF Act does not automatically give farms nuisance 
immunity without first having an opinion issued by the 
Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, determined on a 
case-by-case basis, that the agricultural practice is sound.292 
Citizens are able to challenge the Commissioner’s opinion that 
the farm is not a nuisance.293 The New York Supreme Court 
held that because the state RTF Act does not automatically 
provide farms with immunity from a nuisance suit, it is not 
unconstitutional.294 
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the state’s 
RTF Act was constitutional in a nuisance suit against a farm, 
but failed to discuss why.295 California interpreted its RTF Act 
broadly based on its legislative purpose, holding in one case 
that it did not even allow a trespass claim, even though the 
statute only expressly confers nuisance immunity.296 
The differing approaches to the constitutionality of the RTF 
laws may be due to states’ diverse views about urban 
development and public policy, in addition to differences in the 
text of each statute.297 Due to the varying outcomes in different 
                                                
*8–*11 (Iowa 2004). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 175. 
291. See Pure Air and Water, Inc. of Chemung County v. Davidsen, 246 A.D.2d 786 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that New York’s Right-to-Farm law was constitutional 
because it does not create a property right subject to a compensable taking under the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or under the New York State Constitution); 
Jeff Feirick, Upholding the New York Right to Farm Law, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Aug. 
1999, at 1 (discussing Davidsen). 
292. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 308 (McKinney 2010). 
293. Feirick, supra note 291, at 1. 
294. Davidsen, 246 A.D.2d at 787. 
295. Linn v. Pitts, 858 P.2d 1352 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). 
296. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Tres Amigos Viejos, L.L.C., 100 Cal. App. 4th 550 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
297. Jason Jordan, A Pig in the Parlor or Food on the Table: Is Texas’s Right to Farm 
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states, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 
Bormann, federal constitutionality of RTF Acts remains 
unclear. 
2.  The Plaintiff “Came to the Nuisance” 
Another common defense to a nuisance action is that the 
defendant established its farming facility first, and the 
plaintiff later moved into a known farm area and should thus 
assume that odors and emissions come with the territory.298 
The fact that a plaintiff came to a nuisance, however, does not 
bar the plaintiff from recovery—it only becomes a factor in 
determining the plaintiff’s relief.299 As discussed previously,300 
an AFO cannot use this defense in Washington if the plaintiff 
is “rural” or “agricultural,” especially if the plaintiff resided in 
the area first.301 
B.  Trespass 
Trespass frequently overlaps with nuisance,302 and often 
both apply under the same set of facts, especially in air 
pollution cases. 303 Unlike nuisance, trespass is not statutorily 
defined in Washington; instead trespass is a common law 
doctrine involving the intentional interference with the right of 
exclusive possession of property.304 Thus, courts in Washington 
look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the common law 
when evaluating a trespass action.305 Restatement Section158 
defines trespass as the intentional entrance onto land in 
possession of another, by a person or a thing, or subsequently 
                                                
Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy 
Ensuring Sustainable Growth? 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 943, 962 (2010). 
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1979). 
299. Id. at cmt. b (1979). 
300. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
301. Buchanan, 134 Wash.2d at 684, 952 P.2d at 615–616. 
302. 1 RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2:15 (West 2010). 
303. Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. (ASARCO), 104 Wash. 2d 677, 
689, 709 P.2d 782, 789 (Wash. 1985). 
304. Id. at 681–682, 709 P.2d at 785; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
158 (1979). 
305. See, e.g., Zimmer v. Stephenson, 66 Wash. 2d 477, 403 P.2d 343 (1965); Bradley, 
104 Wash. 2d 677, 709 P.2d 782. 
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remaining on the land without permission of the possessor.306 
A modern trespass can include an invasion that was 
traditionally considered an “indirect” trespass or a nuisance,307 
such as the deposition of microscopic particulates onto one’s 
property.308 It must be reasonably foreseeable that deposition 
of the particles would interfere with the plaintiff’s possessory 
interest.309 
The trespasser is liable for damages from this type of 
trespass,310 but the harm caused must be “actual and 
substantial.”311 The Washington State Supreme Court adopted 
the “actual and substantial” standard in cases involving 
airborne particles in order to curtail a flood of litigation by 
“every landowner within a hundred miles of a manufacturing 
plant.”312 The “actual and substantial” standard contrasts the 
traditional form of trespass, which was historically subject to 
strict liability.313 Courts used to award nominal damages in the 
absence of any actual damages other than the entrance of the 
person or thing onto the property.314 
Litigants often combine nuisance and trespass claims into 
the same action, as it is difficult to conceive of an AFO 
interfering with the exclusive possession of property without 
having a corresponding interference with the use and 
enjoyment of that property. Furthermore, in Washington, 
trespass has a three-year statute of limitations,315 as compared 
to two years for a nuisance action. 
                                                
306. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1979). 
307. See Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 684–692, 709 P.2d at 786–791. See also 1 Envtl. L. 
(West) § 2:15 (2010). 
308. Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 691, 709 P.2d at 790; but see Wendinger v. Forst 
Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App., 2003) (finding that odors and 
microscopic parties do not interfere with exclusive possession of land and do not 
constitute trespass). 
309. Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 691, 709 P.2d at 790. 
310. Zimmer, 66 Wash. 2d 477, 403 P.2d 343. 
311. Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 691, 709 P.2d at 790. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 685. 
314. Id. 
315. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.15.080(1) (2010). 
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1.  Prescriptive Easements Allow Continuous Pollution and 
Defend Against Trespass Claims 
A common defense to a trespass action is that a prescriptive 
easement gave the trespasser a right to use the property. To 
establish proof of an easement, the defendant must show that 
his or her use was adverse to the title owner; was open, 
notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted for the entire 
prescriptive period; and that the owner had knowledge of the 
adverse use while she was able to enforce her rights.316 
The defendants in Bradley v. ASARCO argued that their 
smelter had obtained a prescriptive easement over the 
plaintiff’s property and they were not subject to an action for 
trespass.317 The Washington State Supreme Court disagreed, 
and held that the deposition of particulate matter onto one’s 
property did not meet the “open and notorious” element and 
that in order to gain an easement over neighboring land, the 
pollution would have to be “blatant and flagrant.”318 
An AFO defendant in a trespass action would likely argue 
that its farm had obtained a prescriptive easement by the 
obvious nature of its activities if the situation allows for it. 
This would especially be the case if the plaintiff asserts 
significant harm, wherein she would likely need to concede 
that the trespass was blatant in the AFO context to meet that 
threshold. 
C.  Negligence 
A defendant can commit nuisance and trespass 
negligently319 as long as the plaintiff establishes the required 
elements of a negligence claim—duty, breach, causation, and 
damages.320 Litigants can also bring a negligence action on its 
own, without attaching it to a nuisance, trespass, or other 
theory of liability.321 
                                                
316. See, e.g., Dunbar v. Heinrich, 95 Wash.2d 20, 22, 622 P.2d 812, 813 (1980). 
317. Bradley, 104 Wash.2d at 694. 
318. Id. 
319. See, e.g., Gaines v. Pierce County, 66 Wash. App. 715, 719, 834 P.2d 631, 633 
(Wash. App. Div. 2 1992). 
320. Id. 
321. See, e.g., Pepper v. J.J. Welcome Const. Co., 73 Wash. App. 523, 546, 871 P.2d 
601, 614 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1994); Kaech v. Lewis County Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 
106 Wash. App. 260, 282, 23 P.3d 529, 541 (Wash. App. Div. 2 2001). 
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Negligence requires that the defendant had a duty of 
ordinary care that it violated or breached when the defendant 
failed to act as a reasonable person under like 
circumstances.322 One potential way to establish this breach of 
ordinary care is to prove that an AFO or CAFO violated a 
federal or state environmental statute.323 Negligence per se, or 
an automatic finding of negligence in the event of a breach of a 
duty imposed by a statute, ordinance, or administrative rule,324 
is limited under Washington State law.325 Washington State 
law deems the breach of statutory duty to be evidence of 
negligence rather than proof of negligence.326 
Even absent a direct violation of an environmental statute, 
failure to comply with agency recommendations or suggested 
practices may also be sufficient to establish a deviation from 
the duty of ordinary care.327 For example, the Second 
Restatement of Torts provides that, “compliance with a 
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not 
prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would 
take additional precautions.”328 
The third element of causation, however, can be difficult for 
litigants to prove because they must demonstrate that the 
nearby AFO constituted a “substantial factor” in causing their 
damages.329 In an area like the Yakima Valley, home to over 70 
dairy facilities, it could be difficult to pinpoint just which farm 
was a substantial factor in causing air pollution and foul odors. 
D.  Other Defenses to Common Law Causes of Action an AFO 
May Invoke 
In addition to the cause-of-action-specific defenses of the 
Right-to-Farm Act, “coming to the nuisance,” and the 
obtainment of a prescriptive easement, there are broader 
defenses that an AFO may raise in a common law action. 
                                                
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1979). 
323. Id. § 286. See also Hanson, supra note 89, at 313. 
324. Mattson v. American Petroleum Environmental Services, Inc., 155 Wash.App. 
1024, 2010 WL 1453997 at *2  n.4 (Wash. App. April 13, 2010). 
325. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (2010). 
326. Id. 
327. Hanson, supra note 89, at 314. 
328. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965). 
329. Id. § 431. 
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1.  The Plaintiff’s Claim is Preempted by Environmental 
Statutes 
Defendants in common law environmental suits have argued 
that state and federal environmental statutes preempt some 
common law actions.330 In Bradley, the defendant smelter 
plant asserted that because the text of the WCAA only 
mentioned that it would not preempt nuisance,331 the WCAA 
preempted trespass actions.332 Relying on another section of 
the WCAA that provides that it “shall not be construed to 
create in any way nor to enlarge, diminish or otherwise affect 
in any way any private rights in any civil action for 
damages,”333 the Washington State Supreme Court 
disagreed.334 The Court held that, based on this provision, the 
WCAA does not preclude a suit for damages for additional 
common law actions like trespass.335 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a federal statute will 
preempt a federal common law action if the action relates to a 
pollutant already regulated by the relevant federal statute.336 
However, in International Paper Company v. Ouellette, the 
Court later held that federal environmental statutes do not 
preempt state common law actions because Congress intended 
to allow the states to regulate their resources.337 As such, state 
common law suits would not be inconsistent with the goals of 
the federal statute.338 In line with Ouellette, the Ninth Circuit 
held in 2002 that CERCLA did not preempt a local ordinance 
making the release of a hazardous substance a nuisance per 
se.339 Following this reasoning, so long as litigants bring a 
                                                
330. See, e.g., Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 
694-695, 709 P.2d 782, 792 (Wash. 1985). 
331. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.230 (“[N]othing herein shall be construed to 
supersede any local county, or city ordinance or resolution, or any provision of the 
statutory or common law pertaining to nuisance ...”) (2010). 
332. Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 694-695, 709 P.2d at 792. 
333. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.94.901 (2010) (“This 1967 amendatory act shall not be 
construed to create in any way nor to enlarge, diminish or otherwise affect in any way 
any private rights in any civil action for damages.”). 
334. Bradley, 104 Wash. 2d at 695, 709 P.2d at 792. 
335. Id. 
336. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
337. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
338. See id. 
339. Fireman’s Fund v. City of Lodi, CA, 271 F.3d 911, 53 ERC 1417 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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common law action under state common law, environmental 
statues will not preempt it. 
2.  The Harm Caused is Not Actual, Substantial or 
Significant 
One of the most difficult hurdles for a plaintiff to overcome 
is establishing that the harm to their property was 
“significant,” for nuisance actions340 or caused the “actual and 
substantial” harm required for a trespass.341 Odor is subjective, 
and it is difficult to prove that foul odors cause more than a 
“slight inconvenience or petty annoyance.”342 
In an article discussing common law strategies for litigation 
against CAFOs, Andrew Hanson, currently an attorney for the 
Department of Justice, suggests that agricultural defendants 
would not have a difficult time finding neighbors and other 
community members, and perhaps even other AFO owners, to 
testify that the odors and air pollution are not a nuisance to 
them, which would make the plaintiff’s experience appear 
subjective and hypersensitive.343 However, depending on the 
particular situation, a plaintiff living in close proximity to an 
AFO and suffering from the brunt of the emissions may have 
an easier time showing substantial harm than a plaintiff who 
lives further down the road.344 There may also be a point where 
nearly any reasonable person would recognize an obvious 
nuisance stemming from the waste and related emissions of 
thousands of animals and the constant application of animal 
manure to the land. 
V.  UTILIZING THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW 
FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT CLAIMS AGAINST 
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 
The air quality situation in the Yakima Valley provides a 
                                                
Opinion withdrawn by Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, CA, 287 F.3d 810 (9th 
Cir. 2002). 
340. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979). 
341. Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 692, 709 
P.2d 782, 791 (Wash. 1985). 
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. c (1979); Hanson, supra note 89, 
at 318. 
343. Hanson, supra note 89, at 318. 
344. Id. at 319. 
44
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/4
174 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1 
 
concrete case study for examining how citizens can utilize the 
existing statutory frameworks and the common law to curb air 
emissions from AFOs, and potentially gain monetary or 
injunctive relief. Despite exemptions the farms enjoy from 
environmental statutes and the RTF statute, and in the face of 
likely defenses to common law actions, there is reason to 
believe that directly violating the law, deviating from standard 
agricultural practices, and causing substantial, significant 
harm are all actions that citizens can document to break down 
the exemptions and obtain desired relief. 
A.  Violations of Laws, Ordinances, and Administrative Rules 
Citizens may be able to work around the statutory 
exemptions if the offending farm violated a federal or state 
law, administrative rule, or local ordinance. For example, 
residents could observe a large CAFO violating its CWA 
permit by activities like unlawful spreading of manure on 
frozen ground.345 Other violations of NPDES permits at 
regulated CAFOs, or violations of the RCRA at unregulated 
CAFOs and AFOs, such as the over-application of manure to a 
saturated field, would also constitute noncompliance and have 
happened at local dairies.346 Similarly, the failure to report  
hazardous releases under CERCLA and EPCRA (to the extent 
the statutes are applicable to the facility) would also be 
unlawful. However, the CWA permit system regulates only ten 
CAFOs in Yakima County,347 which are the only facilities 
required to obtain permits and comply with the CWA. The 
numerous remaining dairies are small enough to be considered 
AFOs or small CAFOs, and could, alternatively, be targeted by 
a RCRA action if they violate the statute. 
In addition to direct causes of action pursuant to violations 
of environmental statutes, evidence that an AFO has violated 
a federal or state law, administrative rule, or local ordinance 
can be valuable for several reasons. First, violation of federal 
or state law can be direct evidence to establish a claim of 
                                                
345. Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 
F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1151 (E.D. Wash. 1999); 40 C.F.R. § 412.46(a)(1)(i) (2010). 
346. See State Fines Yakima Valley Dairy for Runoff, SEATTLE TIMES (May 20, 2010, 
12:19 PM) http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2011912390 
_apwadairyfine.html. 
347. Facility/Site Search, supra note 22. 
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negligence348 and of a nuisance per se.349 A nuisance per se 
finding would allow a litigant to circumvent the RTF Act, if 
applicable, which requires defendants to comply with all 
applicable laws. 
Second, MTCA provides that fertilizer application is only 
exempt if it is performed lawfully and is not negligent.350 If a 
regulated CAFO over-applied manure, for example, the MTCA 
reporting exemption would no longer apply, and citizens could 
sue to enforce reporting requirements if and when the CAFO 
emissions exceed the 100 pounds per day threshold when 
applying manure to fields. Third, violations can show that the 
farm operator deviated from standard or good agricultural 
practices, since obeying the law is a standard farming 
practice.351 
B.  Deviation From Standard Agricultural Practices 
Even in the absence of direct violations of the law, litigants 
could avoid applicability of the RTF Act by showing that an 
AFO or CAFO in the area deviates from standard practices by, 
for example, over-applying liquid manure to a saturated field. 
The Act would not provide nuisance immunity if the AFO did 
not use the Act’s required good practices, and it would 
arguably demonstrate negligence as a breach of ordinary 
care.352 It should be noted, however, that establishing exactly 
what the “standard practice” is, in a changing climate of 
farming, could prove difficult.353 
Additionally, even lawful discharges of pollutants in 
compliance with a CWA permit can amount to a nuisance in 
                                                
348. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.050 (2010). 
349. Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 954 P.2d 877, 884 (1998) (“Discharges in 
violation of permit requirements constitute a nuisance which subjects violators to 
damages.”). 
350. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(3)(d) (2010). 
351. Hanson, supra note 89, at 313. 
352. Hanson, supra note 89, at 313; Terrence J. Centner, Nutrient Pollution from 
Land Applications of Manure: Discerning a Remedy for Pollution, 21 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 213, 240-241 (2010). 
353. See Reinert, supra note 254, at 1720–21 (“In statutes that rely on generally 
accepted practices, it is often unclear who determines these practices and who bears 
the burden of proving that a certain practice is generally accepted.”); see also Brehm, 
supra note 97, at 816. 
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Washington.354 The fact that the government tolerates a 
nuisance is not a defense if the action still interferes with the 
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property.355 
Thus, the 10 large CAFOs in the Yakima Valley may have 
permit shields against citizen suits under the statutory scheme 
for violations of the environmental statutes, but CWA 
regulation does not shield against a common law action, even 
when the facilities are in compliance. Even though the 
environmental statutes are littered with exemptions for 
agricultural facilities, and the remaining AFOs in the Yakima 
Valley are not regulated under the CWA, the statutes can still 
be used to demonstrate the ordinary standard of care in a 
common law suit.356 
C.  Establishing Substantial or Significant Harm or 
Substantial Threat to Public Safety and Health 
A nuisance claim requires a showing of significant harm 
that a reasonable person would find offensive.357  Similarly, a 
trespass of microscopic particles or odor requires “actual and 
substantial damages.”358 The RTF Act also does not protect an 
AFO from a nuisance action if the farm is a substantial threat 
to public health or safety.359 
The problems relating to AFOs in the Yakima Valley have 
been featured in numerous news articles,360 books,361 and other 
media, including the Oprah magazine O,362 and the pollution 
                                                
354. Tiegs, 135 Wash.2d at 14-15, 954 P.2d at 884. 
355. Id. 
356. Hanson, supra note 89, at 313. 
357. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979). 
358. Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash. 2d 677, 692, 709 
P.2d 782, 791 (Wash. 1985). 
359. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.305(1) (2010). 
360. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 23; Ward, supra note 18; Leah Beth Ward, Obscure 
Rule on Manure Stirs Controversy, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC (Aug. 17, 2009, 11:31 
PM), http://www.yakima-herald.com/stories/2009/08/17/obscure-rule-on-manure-stirs-
controversy;  State fines Yakima Valley Dairy for Runoff, SEATTLE TIMES (May 20, 
2010, 12:19 PM) http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2011912390 
_apwadairyfine.html. 
361. See, e.g., KIRBY, supra note 20. 
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from the Yakima Valley’s dairy farms has been the subject of 
several lawsuits.363 The EPA even deems the area as one of the 
EPA’s environmental justice “Showcase Communities.”364 
Interviewed residents have said that they cannot go outside 
their homes,365 and one author said that spending time in the 
presence of the farms in the Yakima Valley caused him to 
develop “manure flu:” a mild fever, aching joints, a “phlegmatic 
hack,” and a raspy throat.366 He also recounts opening his 
suitcase after he returned home and being hit with the smell 
all over again from his odor-soaked clothing.367 
With all of this in mind, a jury should not have a hard time 
finding substantial harm, especially if the “right” plaintiff—
one who has suffered from living near an AFO—brought suit. 
The attention the area has received for its air pollution, as well 
as the science backing the health effects related to living near 
an AFO, should qualify as substantial harm for the typical 
resident living near an AFO who has concrete proof of 
experiencing the health effects AFOs typically cause. 
D.  Right to Farm Statute May Not Apply if Farms Were in 
Existence Before AFOs Moved to the Area 
Under Washington’s RTF Act, as interpreted by the 
Washington State Supreme Court, AFOs and CAFOs only 
receive immunity from nuisance actions if an individual who 
has encroached on an established farm or agricultural area 
brings the suit.368 In the case of the Yakima Valley, many of 
the residents are rural and grew up as farmers, 369 making the 
                                                
363. Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 
F. Supp. 2d 1129 (E.D. Wash. 1999); Community Ass’n for Restoration of the 
Environment v. Sid Koopman Dairy, 54 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Wash. 1999). 
364. Environmental Justice Showcase Communities, supra note 25. 
365. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 23; KIRBY, supra note 20 at 3, 43; Down on the 
Factory Farm: The Lower Yakima Valley, ME AND MY PLANET: WATERSHED MEDIA’S 
ONLINE JOURNAL (Nov.18, 2010), http://watershedmedia1.blogspot.com/2010/11/down-
on-factory-farm-lower-yakima.html. 
366. David Kirby, From Homeland to Wasteland, ALL ANIMALS MAGAZINE, 
July/August 2010, available at http://www.humanesociety.org/news/magazines/ 
2010/07-08/from_homeland_to_wasteland_1.html. 
367. Id. 
368. Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders, Ltd. Partnership, 134 Wash. 2d 673, 684, 952 
P.2d 610, 615 (Wash. 1998). 
369. KIRBY, supra note 20, at 43. 
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RTF defense by an AFO inapplicable under Buchanan. 
Additionally, most of the AFOs did not move into the area until 
the 1990s, and some of the residents lived there long before the 
invasion of the factory farms.370 
Residents that lived in the Yakima Valley before the AFOs 
moved in would be excellent candidates to maintain a nuisance 
action because their situation would be analogous to that of 
the Buchanans, who had an existing farm before the nuisance 
farms sprung up next door.371 Also, as discussed above, the 
RTF Act’s immunities may not apply if the AFO is deviating 
from standard agricultural practices and/or is a threat to 
public health or safety. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
American history and ideology reveres farmers and 
agriculture, which leads to potential difficulties in enforcement 
litigation.372 However, today’s AFOs are more industrial and 
are responsible for large amounts of air and water pollution.373 
Despite the fact that CAFOs and AFOs emit hydrogen 
sulfide, ammonia, volatile organic compounds, and particulate 
matter into the air, causing documentable environmental and 
health problems as well as foul odor, these industries enjoy 
exemption under federal and Washington State environmental 
statutes unless they deviate from standard agricultural 
practices or violate the law. Common law actions often prove 
difficult because the harm must be substantial and objectively 
unreasonable. Furthermore, state right-to-farm laws insulate 
AFOs from nuisance liability unless the plaintiff lived in the 
area first, is a farmer, or the AFO is a substantial public 
health risk. In addition, no formal structure is in place for 
measuring air emissions from farming facilities, even if the 
aforementioned exemptions did not exist, and citizens have 
had little success working with the local Yakima Regional 
Clean Air Authority. 
In light of these exemptions, and in order to succeed in their 
quest for relief from AFO-related air pollution and odor, 
                                                
370. Id. 
371. Buchanan, 134 Wash. 2d at 676. 
372. Ruhl, supra note 73, at 265. 
373. Id. 
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litigants in Washington State can still utilize the statutory and 
common law in certain circumstances. By documenting the 
adverse public health effects experienced, proving that they 
are “substantial,” and showing the potential deviations from 
standard agricultural practices or the law by AFO and CAFO 
operators, Washington citizens may achieve a reduction in air 
emissions and obtain individual or public relief. This may, in 
turn, influence industrial farmers in Washington State and 
across the nation to change their practices and reduce their 
impact on the environment and human health. 
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